Saudi Arabia has not remained a neutral observer as the US and Israel set up a campaign against Iran since 28 February. Previously cautious, it has now joined the United States in striking Iranian proxy militias in Iraq after drone attacks on its critical oil sites, asserting a firm deterrent posture.
With the kingdom’s hotspots on the southern Yemen border and the northern Iraq front, the core dilemma is whether to keep striking or to pursue a de‑escalation strategy, potentially through financial incentives, to protect national security and its Vision 2030 plans.
The broader scene pits Iran and its allies – the Houthi rebels in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq – against the US, Gulf Arab states and Jordan, with Israel as a close but currently inactive partner. Drone and missile attacks have recently targeted Saudi ports, the Red Sea, and even vital facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.
Riyadh’s Vision 2030 aims to move the economy from oil dependency to diversified industries, attracting foreign investment and creating new jobs. Yet infrastructure such as data centres and transportation routes remain vulnerable to emerging missile and drone threats.
Saudi forces responded to the drone strike on 13 July by bombarding Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing, prompting Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and shipping lanes in the Bab El Mandeb strait. The conflict threatens to choke the Red Sea corridor, disrupt rough water shipping, and undermine the kingdom’s oil export chain to Asia.
Further complications arise from Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting over 20% of global oil and LNG flows, and from Iran’s requests for increased aggression against US forces to deter future attacks.
Saudi Arabia’s strategies run counter to the long‑term Vision 2030, which clashed with the immediate reality of hostile attacks from beneath and above, threatening to derange the nation’s economic diversification trajectory.
